Titan Submersible Hearings End With Few Strong Responses. Here’s What’s Next

Another shocking omission was Thursday’s testimony from Mark Negley, a Boeing engineer. Negley did the initial design research for the The Titan and assisted OceanGate with inspection equipment and advice for nearly ten years. He testified about the challenges of building carbon-fiber structures.
The panel did not question Negley about an email he sent Rush in 2018 sharing an analysis based on information Rush provided. “We think you are at high risk of major failure at or before you reach 4,000 feet,” he wrote. The email included a chart showing the skull and bones at that depth.
Many Red Flags, Few Strong Responses
This week there was also technical evidence from other expert witnesses on the design and classification of underwater species. All were skeptical, or outright critical of OceanGate’s decision to operate The Titan using a novel carbon-fiber hull with minimal testing, and relying on an unproven acoustic monitoring system for live information on hull integrity.
Roy Thomas from the American Bureau of Shipping testified: “Rapid unloading and deterioration can occur in less than a millisecond. “Real-time monitoring could not capture this.”
Donald Kramer, a materials engineer at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), testified that there are manufacturing defects in the composite deck. He explained the The TitanThe damage appears to have been peeled off into layers of carbon fiber consistent with its multi-stage construction, but he would not give an idea of what might have caused the explosion.
Neither the ship’s manufacturers nor OceanGate’s director of engineering at the time of its construction were called to testify.
MBI chairman Jason Neubauer said in a press conference after the hearing: “We don’t need to get evidence from all the witnesses. As long as we receive factual information and information from the company, through forensics, and other witnesses, we may not interview all the identified witnesses.”
Kramer noted that the data from 2022, when an explosive explosion was heard after the The Titan appeared after immersion in water The Titanicshowed a worrying change of stress in the body. OceanGate’s director of engineering at the time, Phil Brooks, testified that he probably wasn’t qualified to analyze that data, and that Rush manually moved the submersible for its final dive.
Over the past two weeks, many witnesses have testified about Rush’s key role in driving business, engineering, and operational decisions as well as his aggressive and angry personality. Matthew McCoy, an expert on OceanGate in 2017 and a former Coast Guard officer, testified today about a conversation he had with Rush about the discovery The Titan registered and tested.
McCoy recalled that Rush said that if the Coast Guard became a problem, “he would buy off Congress and the problem would go away.” McCoy gave his notice the next day.
What Happens Next
With the conclusion of the public consultation, the Coast Guard’s MBI will now begin preparing its final report. That may include the definitive cause of the fatal accident, the referral of a criminal investigation, and recommendations for future policy and legislation.
I The TitanBody and point of view featured prominently in expert testimony regarding the physical causes of the implosion. Regardless of which part ultimately failed, witnesses leveled criticism at everyone from designers and manufacturers to OceanGate’s executive team and executive decision-making. This can make it difficult to fix on a single cause or to isolate the people who were responsible, other than the Stockton Rush.
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